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What's Wrong with Content Analysis;
A Methodological Critique

by Klaus Krippendorff

June

1969

The Annenberg School of Communications

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Content analysis is a step-child in the family of social sciences methods.
While researchers are agreed regarding the significant role which communication
plays in nearly all social processes, methodologically sophisticated researchers
tend to use controlled experiments, prestructured interviews, surveys or
observational techniques in preference to an analysis of the freely exchanged
verbalizations.

This is rather surprising in view of the fact that messages

represent almost everything that inuividuals feel, social groups do, or cultures

Either content analysis cannot provide what it promises or it is confronted with
unfounded prejudice.

I have yet to find a discussion of the analytical limits or a

good methodological critique of the approach that would put the suspicions on a
sound basis 1

I would like to see the development of techniques for analyzing

messages that are more powerful than those currently available.

To foster such

progress, let me try to list a few critical issues that might be regarded as current
obstacles for growth.
Definitional Ambiguities
The problems of this method begin with the inability to give an unambiguous
meaning to the term "content analysis."
Berels�n's.

Clearly the most celebrated definition is

It reads:

Content analysis is a research technique for the objective,
systematic; and quanitative description of the manifest
content of communication. (Berelson, 1952: 5-6)
Ever since this definition was proposed (Berelson and Lazarsfeld, 1948) the
technique has been attacked from various angles.

After Kracauer's (1952) criticism

and at least since George's (1959) argument in favor of a "qualitative" approach,
the insistence on quantification can hardly be maintained.

Similarly, the interest

of psychoanalysts and social psychologis,ts in the latent patterns in verbal
expressions, suggests that the attribute "manifest" is less useful as

..

a

defining

-2criterion.

In fact Cartwright (1953) suggests to simply remove this restriction.

On the other hand, the two terms "objective" and "systematic" refer to the most
general prerequisites for any scientific method and should be presupposed for any
technique of research. They could very well have been taken for granted without
any loss. What remains then of the definition·is an uninformative sentence of near
tautological appearance as far as the crucial term "content" is concerned:
Content analysis is a research technique for the description
of the content of communication.
The only thing that the definition somewhat elaborates is the term "analysis."
meaning of "content" is left.entirely open;.

The

Content analysis is the analysis of content.

In consequence, whenever someone counts che letters in words he might well say
that he is making a content analysis.

So too could a television repairman who

analyzes the color of the image label his work as content analysis.

This lack

of clarity pre-empts the term "content analysis" of almost all content, a fact
that shares responsibility for the slow methodological progress and the large of
volume of inconsequential research in this area.
Berelson's definition is not the only one.

But most definitions that have

been proposed after his influential book are merely elaborations of it.

For example,

Schutz (1951) argues that the noun phrase "content of communication" be replaced
by "human behavior particularly linguistic," Cartwright (1953) suggests to substitute
the same term with "ariy symbolic behavior."

Holsti (1968) replaces Berelson' s

"research technique" by "any technique for making inferences" and prefers "process
of identification of specified characteristics" to the term "description" in
Berelson's classical definition.
A notable exception to this derived class of definitions is Jaruis' attempt

to give an operational account of what

a

researcher does when engaged in content

.. ,
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analysis:
rrcontent analysis" may be defined as referring to any technique
(a) for the.classification of sign-vehicles, {b) which relies
solely upon the judgments - which theoretically, may range from
perceptual discriminations to sheer guesses - of an analyst or
group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles fall into which
category, (c) on the basis of explicitly formulated rules,
{d) provided that the analyst's judgments are regarded as the
reports of a scientific observer. The results of a content
analysis state the frequency of occurrence of signs - or groups
of signs - for each category in a classification scheme (Janis,
1943: 429)
A similar account has been given by Miller (1963). ·But I am not so happy
with this approach either because the task of assigning identifiable incidents of
a concept to well defined categories is only one step in a complex research design.
It is identical with the process of generating data in Coomb's (1964) sense or
with the making of fundamental measurements as discussed by Campbell (1928).
Indeed, Paisley (1967) has taken such a view of content analysis to its logical
conclusion and crons.ider:s the astonomers' ·traditional classification of stars and
the biologists' more recent use of numerical taxonomy and the social scientistsf use
of verbal and non-verbal material all under this generic term.
Definitions are surely not the most importan! things to struggle about and
would not otherwise deserve attention were it not for the fact that they have
consequences which are not necessarily desirable.

Indeed it can be argued that

the current lack of definitional clarity has at the least invited confusion as to
the analytical objectives, suitable methodology and subject-matter domain.
Because of tlie'sedefinitional ambiguities I wish to disregard explicit definitions
of "content analysis" in favor of what content analysts do and say, i.e., how
"content anal:ysis" is implicitly understood in the context of research .

..

-4The Absence of Validity Criteria
The second.problem I see is that content analysts seem to be least concerned
with validating their results. . This may in part be rooted,J,n the peculiar his tory
"f//€.<

of the technique but is most probably due to the unclear conc·eptualization of
the analytical process which makes the validation of content analysis results
difficult if not impossible.
To take the historical dimension first, it is not unfair to say that content
analysis started as a rhetorical device. ,:•:-·.rt was used to support public judgments
regarding press performance by supplying figures to journalistic arguments.

The

intervention by the social sciences, four decades ago, introduced more elaborate
conceptual categories and more sophisticated computational techniques for analysis
but did not change much in the spectrum of problems that were associated with
the mass media.

Although content analysis has now penetrated almost all disciplines

concerned with man, most studies make use of mass media material and are concerned
with revealing evaluative biases, undersirable attitudes, inadequate representation,
co'\le;rage or attention.

For such concerns validity criteria � virtually -�-

existent except perhaps by public consent.

There are some exceptions to this

generalization which I will mention briefly.
In order to consider the methodologically untenable conceptuali3ation of the
analytical process next, let me inquire into the decision criteria that go into
the design of a content analysis.

The first step of such analyses,involves a

recording of data, i.e., an assignment of words, sentences or paragraphs of a
written document to categories or a classification of symbolic elements identifiable
in a pictorial representation according to specified rules.
Of methodological significance is the fact that the research designer is(:free to
chosia among the possibleocategories, i.e·., among the1 possible rules with which sign-

.. .

. -5vehicles are assigned to a mutually exclu s ive set of analytical terms.

As Janis

(1943) points out thes e rules must be explicitly formulated and applied reliably.
The importance of c_h oo.si n0g good categories has been emphasized by almost all writers
in the field.

As early as 1948 Berelson and Lazarsfeld stressed:

Content analysis stands or falls by its categories•.• Studies
done on a hit-or-mi s s basis without specific problems for
investigation and with vaguely or poorly articulated categories
are almost certain to be of indifferent or low quality as re
search productions. Although competent performance of other
parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the invention
and definition of appropriate categories takes on critical
importance. Since categories contain the substance of the
investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its
system of categories (1948: 80)
The authors continue:
••• Since communication materials contain almost everything
people say or do, the production of relevant categories is.
limited only by the analyst 1 s imagination in stating a
problem for investigation and designing categories to fit
the problem (1948: 101)
Although much of the quotation as serts the importance of appropriate choices,
key criteria for such choices seem to be derivable from a "problem of investigation."
Osgood also emphasize,s this point when stating that "the nature, number and
breadth of categories•••depend upon the purpose s of the investigation.

If the

analyst has a very specific purpose, he will select his content categories around
this core" (Osgood, 1959: 62).

But what is a suitable problem of investigation in

content analysis and how is such a problem to affect decisions concerning particular
category s chemes?

Berel s on, Lazarsfeld and others require of a content analysis

that the categories be chosen to test� hypotheses.

Although this is not

included as a definitional requirement they make the point quite clear:
The derivation of hypotheses for a content analysis study is
of central importance, since the hypotheses determine the
nature of the categories as well as the framework of actual

.. ,

results. The hypotheses derive out of the nature of the
problem and they in turn are translated into categories
for analysis. It can hardly be over-stressed that the
prior construction of appropriate hypotheses is indis
pensable for a sound and fruitful anal:y:sis ..• if the problem
was not clarified to the point where several worthwhile
hypotheses can be formulated (in advance), then the pro
jected content analysis should be abandoned. One should
not analyze unless or until he has something concrete and
specific to analyze for (underlined in the original)
$erelson and Lazarsfeld 1948: 92).
If there is no constraint on how categories are defined, i.e., if categorization
rules can be chosen freely by the content analyst, particularly after he has
familiarized himself with the text to be analyzed, then almost any desirable
If, in addition, the t,erms of the hypotheses

frequency distribution can be created.

t_o_ be· :tested are exclusively defined 10n! the data which a content analysis
provides, i.e., on the categories or derivations �hereof, then it is possible to
define categorization rules so that nearly any hypothesis can be confirmed or rejected
at will.

This simply means that the validity of the process is indeterminate.

To put the argument in different words:

which of a set of hypotheses is to

be accepted depends on the distribution of occurrences over categories.

Which

distribution is obtained depends on the way those rules are defined according to
which given observations or unitized symbols are ass_igned to'-'::those categories. i
The content analyst is free to chose any categorization rule that seems to suit
· his purposes.

Hence, whether a hypothesis so "supported" is in fact valid depends

on the analyst's intuition in setting up categories and perhaps on the coders' native
ability to interpret1the text in meaningful terms.'

The-method is not conclusive.

The problem is that content analyses of this kind do not employ evaluative
criteria that would anchor the process to phenomena outside the data that are
being analyzed.

Two exceptions to this general rule should be noted.

The first is the use of standardized categories.

If a variety of documents

are described in terms of the same system of categories then distributional

..
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differences presumably reflect true differences among the documents, permit
inferential classifications, etc. Whether such differences are meaningfully
interpretable is of course another question.

In reality, these methodologically

advantageous standardized categories have not replaced the convenient ad hoc
categories.

In fact, many content analysts argue against standardizations.

"Proponents of this view," as Budd and Thor.p put it," maintain that every content
analysis is unique, presenting its mm. individual problems that require individual
handling" (1963: 13).

Pool too believes that not enough research has been done

to establish standardized measures in content analysis.

"Such a measure is

convenient when a considerable number of researchers are working on the same
variable, and when someone succeeds in working out good categories for that variable.
It is doubtful that either of those criteria can be met in most areas of content
analysis••• until that time there is a good deal to be said for ad hoc categories"
(Pool, 1959: 213-124).
Lasswell used standardized content analysis procedures in his attempt to detect
foreign propaganda sources in domestic publications as early as the 1940's
(Lasswell, 1949). Similar uses of standardized categories are difficult to find.
Recent advances in processing text by computer have changed the situation somewhat.
For example, the dictionaries in Stone's General Inquirer have by now been applied
in a great number of situations (Stone, et al., 1966) and the properties of the
resulting distributions are increasingly understood. Numerous meaningfully
interpretable statistical differences have vindicated the research efforts.
The second way to relate a content analysis procedure to phenomena outside
the analysis is by what Janis (1949) call�-indirect validation: The result of a content
analysis is sliown to correlate with some characteristics of the data source.
·Dollard and Mowrer's (1947) Discomfort-Relief Quotient has been shown to indicate
the stress of a speaker,Flesch's (1951) measures of readability have been correlated

-8-

with the reading performance about which they are claimed to be predictive.

s
Similarly has Holsti (1965) used the correlation of his content analysis measure

with the Dow-Jones-index as evidence for the validity of his results.

But these

are rare examples of the use of psychological, social or cultural indicators.
Indicators are too often established by fiat.

However, their correlation with the

na of which they are said to be indicative has to be demonstrated.
phenome
'

As a rule, content analysts are not interested in inconsequential descriptions

of connnunications.

--

--

-- -- ---- - ----

analysis are related to real
of a content ---"--But how the results --

world phenomena is often difficult to�testable in principle.

Just which of the innumerably many

The fact that it is sometimes quite costly to carefully

establish indicators by this technique is.no excuse.

Many content analysts do not

even care to raise questions of validity, declare the referential meaning of their
measures by fiat or suggest that their results be accepted on the basis of face
validity only.

The example of the unjustified equation of frequency _of mention

with attention is discussed below.

This situation is certainly not tenable.

An

analytical procedure that aims at describing phenomena of the real world - however
abstract they may be - must be such that validating information can be brought to
bear on its results.
The Lack of
-------

This can rarely be said for most content analyses.

Semantic Considerations

The third problem which I wish to consider is the frequent disregard of the
semanticity of the data in content analysis procedures,

It is one thing to argue

that the material to be analyzed is symbolic, has meaning or consists of commun
ications between human agents and quite a different thing to analyze or to process
data in a way appropriate to their recognized semantic properties.

This confusion

between intuitive criteria for defining a sainple for analysis and between criteria
that go into the explicit analytical process employed may have its roots in uncertain

-9analytical objectives but is equally likely the result of common unawareness of the
semantics involved in the analytical process.
Current linguistic theory does not consider "content" central to its concern.
But whenever it appears in the literature, for example by Antal (1964), it tends
to be used in the sense of a referent or a denotatum. The content of a message is
what the message is about.

The content of a theory is the empirical reality in

which the theory _claims explanatory or predictive power.
is what the statement refers to.

The content of a statement

Something has no content if it is not informative

of anything other than its own physical_properties •
. If content is understood in this way, then the task of content analysis becomes
somewhat dubious. The content analysis of a book on child rearing practices would
simply mean to study the child rearing practices that happen to be described and
the content analysis of a report on Vietnam would require the analyst to go to
Vietnam and analyze what the report refers to.

Obviously, content analysis cannot

mean an analysis of communications content but perhaps an analysis of how content
is expressed,
In suggesting this slight shift from an analysis of content to an analysis of
expression the dist1nction between observable events and symbols that stand for
something is confounded in another curious way.

Much of content analysis seems to

incorporate the naive notion of "content"� something that is contained in the
vehicles of communication, as something that merely needs to be extracted from the
primary data, as something that objectively exists independent of an interpreter.
This is a confusion that general semanticists have tried to fight with the slogan
"don't confuse the·map with the territory."

In the terms of this analogy, content

analysis is very much like a way of cutting a map into thousands of little pieces
of paper, sorting and counting these pieces according to their color and shape and
asserting that the resulting frequency distribution says something about the map
maker.

..
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-- but a content analysis of political maps has

indeed been done (Speier, 1941) :though in a methodologically different spirit.
It was designed to reveal the national interest;s of the map maker.

Impressionistic

as the process was, the analysis neither unitized the maps npr relied exclusively
on evidence "contained" in them.

As

an important analytical ingredient it involved

a comparison of the maps with what was known about the territory.

In other words,

the analysis considered the semantic relations employed and searched for how
different representations of the same territory could be explained.

However, this

example is not at all representative of the many content analyses that are published.
To continue with the map analogy, one might argue that a scientific observer
who classifies sign-vehicles -- to use Janis' phrase -- or that a trained coder
who transcribes identifiable incidents of a concept produces something like a map
of a map, the initial map being natural language expressions, photographic images,
etc. The map and the map of a map consist of meaningfully ordered symbols (as
opposed to observable events) which is another way of saying that maps are
representative of something.
..Q!1

those symbols do

_Q_;:

--

The semanticity�of thelmap'implies which operations
1

do !!£!: destroy the nature of the map.

If a geographical

map is cut into small pieces than the representation of distances between geographical
locations :is..: lost.

This might not be undesirable where only distributional

characteristics (e.g., the proportion of urban to rural areas) are wanted. But when
geometrical character�stics of the territory are the focus of analysis a cutting
into pieces destroys the representation of interest.
What I would like to point out with this analogue is that an analytical procedure
(e.g., cutting into pieces, classifying and counting) derives its appropriateness
not only from a research objective but most importantly from the structure of the
content that the set of ordered symbols, e.g., of the map, represents.

The factor

that ultimately determines which analytical operations are meaningful is the content,
i.e., something that is essentially outside the data though represented by it but
certainly not contained in it.

·-11-

Since it is difficult to specify analytical proced�es that are essentially
controlled by content that is outside the immediately observable, content analysis
has flourished with the systematic use of infor�ed judges, human interpreters, or
coders.

When generating analyzable data, i.e., constructing maps of maps, coders

can easily take account of the semantic properties of connnunications.

If content

analysis stops at this stage the semanticity of data has clearly been considered.
However, virtually<:.all .content analystsdgo .beyond the"·coder§l�srespoiises'rrfind to "more
interesting stuff":

count, cross tabulate, cluster, factor analyze, etc.

The

danger of using such computational devices is that their mathematical structure
might not have anythi�g to do with the structure of the content that is represented
in data.

They assume that everything that needs to be considered is contained in

the data, they assume the data not to be representative of anything except perhaps
in a primitive way by one-to-one correspondence.
A good example is the use of factor analysis in this context.

This is an

extremely powerful statistical technique which incorporates a host of assumptions .about associational dependencies and about ways of accounting for them.
be applied on any data that satisfy certain formal requirements.

It can
..

Being highly

flexible and imaginative, human coders can translate complex symbolic material
in appropriate terms.
uninterpretable.

However, the results of facton analysis are often virtually

It is amazing to see how analysts who admire the rigor of such

an analysis are forced to make sense out of their computer outprints.

Much time is

spent in trying out ideas about what the factors could be construed to refer to.
With sufficient creativity, theory and plain luck it might indeed be possible to
undo some of the harm that an inadequate analytical procedure can do to the
semanticity of· the data by finding a way of relating the results to experiences.
But often the product becomes artificial and untenable and certainly not explicatable •

..

-12-

-12-

The situation is precisely analogue to one in which hypothetical dimensions are given
to an analyst that account for much of the variance in color, shape, lettering, etc.
of paper chips made of our geographical maps and the analyst is asked ta reflect bn
what can be said about the territory or of the map-maker in terms of these dimensions.
The lesson that needs to be drawn from these examples is that content is
difficult to analyze, that the naive notion of content as something objectively
contained in data is inadequate and that data processing which does not violate the
representational nature of data requires a lot of insight into semantic structure
which content analysts rarely exhibit and :seldom aim to achieve.
How content analysis incorporates semantic considerations in its procedure
(other than by using human coders in its initial stage) is not so clearly discernible.
Nevertheless, volumes of content analyses are published and I take it that each
such analysis is required to operationalize the concept of "content" either
explicitly or implicitly.

These possibly hidden conceptions may impose limits on the

scope of the analysis and therefore deserves attention.

Let me try to examine a few

of these dimensions and start out with content as a premeating characteristic.
Content ·as� Permeating Characteristic
A common analytical problem in much of social research is the rigorous

reduction of the volume of raw data to manageable quantities.

In content analysis

such simplification is achieved by enumerating the relevant units of observation
(sign-vehicles, words, sentences, paragraphs, occurrences, etc.) according to. some
category scheme which is imposed on a given text.

Enumerations of this kind lead

to relative frequencies, association measures or other statistical indices of th�
distribution of category assignments.

..
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A logical prerequisite of categorization and enumeration is the discriminability
of mutually exclusive units within the symbolic materiai to be analyzed.

However,

the most significant feature of such simplifications is that the relative position
of the categorized units within a text cannot be maintained.

Thus, the statistical

measures that are computed in this way are always measures of permeation.
Stone even went so far as to make the assessment of permeating characteristics
a defining aim of content analysis.

He suggests that "' content analysis' refers

to any procedure for assessing the relative extent to which specified references,
attitudes, or themes that permeate a given message or document" (Stone, 1964).
Unfortunately, sound theoretical bases for justifying the unitization of sign
vehicles in terms of meanings, content or other symbolic qualities are not available
at this point.

According to Pool the problem of "basic units of meaning· of

relevance to content analysis" has been considered at the first conference on
content analysis at Allerton House.

The working definition that emerged at this

meeting turned out to be an entirely statistical one.

It identifies "a basic unit

of meaning" with "relatively litt;le freedom for variation within it, but much
freedom at its boundaries.

Habit strengths are strong, transitional probabilities

high within it but low across its boundaries.

Such a unit, if it exists, is a

kin4 of building block" (Pool, 1959: 203) that could provide the logical basis
for categorization and enumeration.
The conference discussed this issue, could not find a satisfactory solution,
and had to leave the matter of "basic units" vague.
writes Pool,

11

"It is one of the problems,"

to which psycholinguistics may help to produce an answer.

But as of

now it is not clear how one identifies a basic unit of meaning" (Pool, 1959: 203-204).
Linguists, on the other hand, start out with the assumption that words, while
isolable on statistical grounds are inherently relatively meaningless unless viewed
in the context of the syntactic and semantic structure of a language.

..,

Such a

-14structure, however, is precise1y "counted away" when a syntactical or statistical
notion of unitization is employed.

Semantic information that might reside between

or among such units enters at best through the backdoor of an extra analytical
interpretation.
Regardless of how units are defined the theoretical meaning of permeation measures
is not clarified either.

Whether words, cpoliticaLsymbols, propositions, themes or

even thersilences of 1 a.. conversation-are . counted, onePis:, always ·lead�to· such questions
I

as "what do frequencies indicate?"

"what characteristics of content could possibly

permeate the connnunication in a statistically detectable way?" When for example,
the political· symbol "freedom" appears in a country A with the highest relative
frequency while the political symbol "dictator.ship" takes the first rank among the

political symbols mentioned in country B, "What does this mean? Are the people of

country A more free than those of country B? The premise which seems to underly a
confirmatory answer to this question could _very well be reversed on the ground

that people talk most about what they don't have.

The inferences that· can be drawn

from the degree to which identifiable sign-vehicles permeate particular communications
are most certainly not.obvious.
Since Lasswell's (1941) World Attention Survey content analysts have taken
the relative frequency with which a sign-vehicle, sentence pattern, etc, appears in
a text as a measure for the amount of attention devoted to the phenomena signified
by those vehicles.

Unfortunately the identification of the relative frequency

with relative attention has found little evidential support and content analysts who
rely on such postulates cannot consider themselves on safe grounds.
For one thing, language can be used instrumentally in which case attention is
devoted to something indirectly linked but not manifestly contingent on that symbol.
For example, a writer under Stalinist rule whore concern lies in the opposition to
this form of government would be a fool to use the symbol "dictatorship" or even

.. ,

.,..15"decentralization" too freely in public.

He is more likely to argue in economic

terms or express concern with the working conditions of the people or their living
standard.

He will conciously conceal the true object of his attention by controlling

the frequency of use of certain critical symbols.

When early psychological theories

of stimulus reinforcement were applied to political propaganda which is highly
instrumental in nature the sheer frequency of stimulation was thought to have
considerable significance.

But as it turns out, such theories cannot account for

instrumental usages of communication either.

They reduce communicators and

audiences to rather primitive mechanisms of habituation.

Similarly does a concious

� of communication tend� escape the measures of permeation.
Psychological experimentation has produced other examples that critically
oppose the frequency-attention identification:

symbols when repeated frequently

may lose their original meanings up to the point where they become habitual
utterances devoid of cognitive or behavioral consequences.

This is the essence of

experimental work on "semantic satiation" (Lambert, 1960).

It suggests that high

relative frequency of a symbol

may

under certain conditions be indicative of

meaninglessness rather than of high attention.
George (1959), who participated in the extensive efforts to obtain military
intelligence from foreign domestic propaganda during World War II, provided quite
different examples in which statistically insignificant occurrences yielded reliable
bases of prediction •

.While also interested in such message characteristics as

"the German war mood" which permeated domestic broadcasts, the simple presence or
absence of a reference in a political speech or news cast seemed to provide more
important indicators of changes in military situation, etc. than permeation
measures could·offer.
In content analysis, permeation measures seem to be productive where the problem
is one of inferring emotional states that are unconciously revealed in free speech

... 16(Mahl, 1959); or where the identity of the author of an unsigned document can be
based on so-called "minor encoding habits" (Paisley, 1964) of which the writer is
not aware.

In other words, the indicative power of permeation measures seems to

be limited by the extent to which the expression of content is under control
by the source.
Content� Intersubjectively Verifiable
A fifth critical issue in content analysis has to do with the manifestness,
the reliability and the uniqueness of content,

This might seem to be a strange

cluster of concepts but it hangs together through the notion of intersubiective
verifiability.
Let me start out with Berelson and Lazarsfeld's initial idea that content
analysis should be limited to a study of the manifest content of communications.
It seems that the so-called "manifest-latent controversy" which this definition
invited is merely a semantic confusion due to idiosyncrat�cally chosen words.
Berelson and Lazarsfeld use these terms quite unambiguously.

They argue:

If one imagines a continuum along which various corrnnunications
are placed depending upon the degree to which different members
of the intended audience get the same understandings from them,
one might place a simple news story on a train wreck at one end
(since it is likely that every reader will get the same meanings
from the content) and an obscure modern poem at the other (since
it is likely that no two readers will get identical meanings
from the content). Other kinds of content will fall at various
points along this continuum. Thus analysis of manifest content
is applicable to materials at the one end of the continuum
where understanding is simple and direct and not at the other.
Presumably, there is a point on the continuum beyond which the
"latency" of the content (i.e., the diversity of its under
standing) is too great for reliable analysis (1948: 7-8).
It is only because of the unintended common meaning of "latent" as something
hidden or unobservable that the controversy arises. For the two authors the
manifest-latent continuum is operationa1ly identical with intersubjective
verifiability.

.. ,

-17Intersubjective verifiability is also the underlying conception of content in
Janis'· sign-theoretical framework in terms of which reliability and validity in
content analysis is discussed (Janis, 1949) •

If two scientific observers cannot

agree as to the assignment of sign-vehicles to categories, the data cannot be
trusted and relied upon in subsequent analyses.

In this sense the analyzability

of symbolic material is limited by the intersubjective verifiability of category
assignments.

But, this limitation applies to the hidden content as well, thus

leaving no operational distinction between manifestness and latentness in the
connnon meaning of the terms to which Cartwright (1953).refers.
But of crucial importance is that the perfectly justifiable notion of inter
subjective verifiability as a conditions on scientific observation is extended to
a "uniformity of comprehension and understanding" for a large majority of interpreters.
This becomes explicit in another quotation from Berelson, who requires that
•••the content be accepted as a "corrn:non meeting-ground" for
the communicator, the audience, and the analysts.
That is,
the content analysts assumes that the "meanings" which he
ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain categories,
correspond to the "meanings" intended by the corrn:nunicator
and/or understood by the audience. In other words, the . ·
assumption is that there is a common universe of discourse
among the relevant parties, so that the manifest content can
be taken as a valid unit of study (Berelson, 1952: 19).
It seems to ·me that intersubjective verifiability in this extended form is
neither a necessary nor a desirable requirement in content analysis.

Firstly, it

tends to discard as irrelevant the relative sophistication of the scientific observer
and, secondly, it seems to discard differences in perception and interpretation
that might be of interest in corrn:nunication research.
Let me begin with the first restriction due to intersubjective verifiability
across communicators, receivers and analysts.

By way of illustration, let me turn

to Adorno's discussion of mass media content.

He postulates "various superimposed

.. ,

-18layers of different degrees of manifestness or hiddenness that are utilized •••as
a•.•means of 'handling' the audience" of television. His main hypothesis is that
the "hidden message may be more important than th_e overt, since this hidden
message will escape the controls of consciousness," (Adorno, 1?60: 470-480) and
will therefore not be subject to the same modes of interpretation.

Adorno gives

two examples of television plays which are overtly intended to be amusing and
comical.

Their ''. 'hidden meaning' emerges simply by the way the story looks at

.human beings; thus the audience is invited to look at (and identify with) the
characters in the same way without being made aware that indoctrination is present"
(Adorno, 1960: 480-481).

Thus if a content analysis of television drama were to

consider only those features about·which the communicators, the audience members
and the scientific observer are conscious and in agreement, only the most overt
characteristics of messages could be considered.
Similarly, do psychoanalysts find it useful to deal with underlying motivations,
deep-rooted feelings and suppressed experiences about which mental patients are
rarely aware and are seldom able to talk.

In such situations a "uniformity of

comprehension and understanding" between analyst and patient can hardly be assumed.
It would obviate psychoanalysis altogether.
It seems to me that intersubjective verifiability in this extended form may
have had its roots in the difficulty of finding suitable validity criteria in
content analysis.

The argument in favor of this requirement is like this:

a

scientific observer is known to be representative of a population of communicators
and audience members; that observer responds to a message in such and such a way.
Hence the population of communicators and audience members will respond in such and
such a way.

However any elementary statistics suggests that the probability of a

sample of size one to be representative of a large population is very low.

..
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of communicators and audience is unsatisfactory also in a second respect,

The

fact is that individuals who occupy different nodes in a communication network
rarely interpret the same messages in identical ways.

What is meaningful for

an advertiser on TV is not necessarily meaningful for a consumer. What a communicator
intends to express is rarely identical with what a receiver perceives it to be, etc,
In almost any complex social event m�ssages have more than one interpretation.
There is no such thing as the content.

The analyst has to specify a population of

interpreters in reference to which he can proceed.
Janis too recognizes that messages obtain different qualities depending on
the class of individuals whose responses are to be estimated:

"the classification

procedures of semantical content analysis••• require the classification of sign
vehicles on the basis of the coordinated signification responses of some class of
sign interpreters" (Janis, 1943: 432). Here intersubjective verifiability has not
been abandoned.

It is merely restricted to a particular audience that the analyst

delineates in advance.
Perhaps Lasswell had a similar search for meaningful external references in
mind when writing:

"although word counting is involved in the study of communication

not all quantitative procedures are necessarily 'content analysis.' The term can
legitimately be applied only when 'counts' are undertaken with reference to a
general theory of the communication process" (Lasswell, 1949: 387).

A theory of

human communication that could relate the roles of the communicators, facilitate
a description of the underlying dynamics and ultimately justify what the content
analysts counts is yet to be developed.
But it is well known that much of human communication arises in asymmetrical
social relations between communicators and proceeds on the basis of unequal

"'

-20interpretations of messages.

For example, political power is often defined in terms

of one individual's ability to influence others, i.e., as a connnunication process.
This process may ax,4may not -1rnvolve"unequal access'" to information but, is definitely an
asynnnetrical one.

Similarly may the television viewer find hims�lf increasingly

involved in an entertaining program while its growing popularity helps the sponsor
to sell his goods.

For the one the program is interpreted as fun and leisure,

for the other it is a convenient mea?s to direct public attention.

To englect

such differences is to discard the possibility of contributing to an understanding
of connnunication.
The logical consequence of such situations is that content analysts should
analyze messages in as many ways as required to account for how individuals or social
organizations become related with each other by means of the messages they exchange.
However, content analysts who subscribe to the extended form of intersubjective
verifiability require that the categories of analysis are mutually exclusive.
unit of meaning is a ssigned to one category only.
text is unique.

One

The content associated with a

The assignment of a unit of observation to two or more categories

is regarded as an error.
And yet there seems to be no a prionreason for not.allowing a content analysis
to consider those interpretative differences that could shed light on the possible
dynamics.of communication. What needs to be rejected is the notion of intersubjective
verifiability across communicator, audience and scientific observer.

-21Content as Individually Realizable
_Built into content analysis is another important restriction.

It lies in the

almost exclusive reliance on a psychologi.cal formulation of the recording process.
The use of trained but otherwise unaided scientific observers implies that content .,
is identifiable by an observer, i.e., it is individually realizable.
By "psychological formulation of the recording process" I do not suggest that
categories are held to be of psychological significance only.

As Barcus' (1959)

tabluation of the content analysis literature shows, categories of content refer
more often to social matters such as prejudice, social stereotypes, majority and
minority representation or to political matters such as attitudes toward ideological
complexes, pro and con fascism, political symbbls and values of elites.

Essential

is that such interpretations are being made by a human observer whose interpretations
are merely thought to be more reliable and precise than the average reader, listener
or viewer.

According to Berelson:
In a sense, content analysis occurs whenever someone surrnnarizes
and/or interprets what he reads or hears••.But in the more
limited sense in which it is used here, content analysis denotes
a .•.method •.•intended to provide precise and concise descrip
tions of what the connnunication says ••• (Pool, 1952: iii).

Whatever it is that is to be recorded, it is always "someone" who summarizes,
interprets or estimates an apparently intangible message characteristic.

This is

true whether this "someone" is a scientifically trained judge who becomes an
essential part of the analytical procedure or whether it is a communicator and/or
audience member in reference to whom the analysis is made.

The meanings, significa

tions, and contents are assumed to be housed solely in an individual human being.
They are, so to speak, anthropocentral attributes.
As a consequence of this individual-centered conception of content, Schutz
(1951) goes so far as to declare that content analysis is primarily a psychological

..

-22method of inquiry.

How it is related to the technique of projective tests can

be seen as follows:
Both, content analysis and such projective tests as the Rorschach and the
Thematic Apperception Test offer a person texts, visual displays and other material
for a symbolic interpretation.

The difference merelr lies- in the interp:i:'etation f of

the results obtained in such situations.

While response variations in content

analysis are assumed to be due to some characteristics in the material presented
to the respondent, response variations in projective tests are assumed to be due to
variations in the respondents personality.

By controlling for reliability and

forcing judges to follow explicit categorization rules, content analysis at least
aims at setting possible personality differences of the respondents at invariance.
Projective tests, on the other hand, try ho standardize the relatively ambiguous
material presented t o the respondents and thus hope to gain certainty about the
way mental mechanisms are expressed in the responses and the way in which elicited
projections are to be interpreted reliably.
In projective tests the type of information of interest is individual
psychological in nature, i.e., it refers to perception, cognition, motivation,
affective processes, etc.

In content analysis, on the other hand, desired information

typically goes far beyond individual variables and tends to refer to rocial and
political phenomena as well.
Let ,me consider a very connnon focus in content analysis:

products of modern

mass culture in industrialized societies such as books, records· of popular music,
television shows, fads or fashions, popular celebrities.

While these messages are

distributed on a mass basis to very large audiences whose memb�rs enjoy them and
respond to them more or less as individuals they are undoubtedly the outcome of
highly organized collaborations of man and machines, each participant of which
fulfills specialized functions in, derives motivations and obtains rewards from
those complex organizations called the "entertainment industry."

-23It is, of course, always possible to apply

a

psychologically based content

analysis procedure to industrially produced messages and come up with some subjectively
satisfying description of their characteristics.

After all, individuals are involved

in the process, perceive and interpret what. they recieve.

However, the discovery

of antecedent conditions of such corrnnunications which go beyond the habitual
interpretations by single individuals are likely to escape a concept of content that
is based on individually realizabili�y.

Mass media audiences perceive only the

front of a stage made up of authors, actors, simple interpersonal relations, social
situations or features purposefully cultivated about them.

Judges chosen from

such audiences are more likely to achieve reliability along habituated lines.
The constraint which this approach to content analysis imposes on its possible
results refers specifically to the impact of more complex, super-individual, socio
technological structures of which mass entertainment is merely the outcome.

The

personification of modern governmental machineries or of international relations
is a symptom of this incapability.

Or, to stick to the mass media example that

under these conditions individual authors are still associated with their final
products is but an unconscious remainder of pre-industrialized culture and a useful
sales argument skillfully manipulated by the entertainment industry at large.
Adorno put it vividly:

As

"To study television shows in terms of the psychology of

the authors would almost be tantamount to studying Ford cars in terms of the
psychoanalysis of the late Mr. Ford" (Adorno, 1960: 482).

The difference appears

in the multiplicity of aspects under which the successful entertainment industry
tends to view its own products and the singleness with which such a product appears
to an individual.

As messages are prepared for transmission this multiplicity of

functionally interlinked 'contents' which reflect the complexity of institutional
communication networks tends to become systematically reduced to a simple, single
and functional interpretation which the individual consumer �nd analyst) is willing
to accept.

-24The fact that virtually no objections have been raised regarding the limitations
that human observers introduce in content analysis seems to be indicative of the
positions that this investigative tool occupies. With its emphasis on individually
meaningful single interpretations it is ideally suited to inquire into the reception
of single or statistically aggregated individuals in mass audiences.

Content analysis

is then severely bound by the nature of th.e popularizations, the images and points
of view that the entertainment industry tries to create and to maintain.

It can do

nothing but conform when seeking validating support for its results in the individual
ized mass media audience.
Whenever messages mediate between social structures of some complexity, i.e.,
can be regarded as produced and/or received by social organizations, large institutions
or industrial complexes, it is very unlikely that an individual can identify such
pattern. Messages must be expected to exhibit an extremely complicated

11

grammar"

and "semantics11 with rules that go beyond the information processing capacity of
single human observers, however trained. The analysis of messages tha� are the
products of complex cOJmnunications networks, of social organizations or of cultures
is necessarily very involved. Hall (1961) realized the necessity for a conceptual
framework in which messages that transcend the lifetime of individual beings are
meaningful. But he could not provide practical procedures for analysis either.
The ease with which individual-psychological conceptualizations are projected onto
complex social structures, or the readiness with which social events are explained
through the cognitive processes and psychological concepts of their participants has
no empirical basis but has a long history and continual support in western philosophy.
The definitions of signs, symbols, language, etc., tend to be such that they
uniquely segregate man from animals on the one hand and the individual from society
on the other.
nonexistent.

A concept of content that is superindividually realizable is virtually

It is not difficult to conceive of analytical procedures that would incorporate
superindividual concepts of content.

Corrnnunication structures can be derived from

valid social theories just as conceptual categories are said to follow from cognitive
theories.

These connnunication structures represent something like a social grarrnnar

for a complex message involving several individual interpreters.

In the form of

an analytical procedure they can provide the system constructs that would render
the behavioral differences of specialized observers meaningful.

But this is for

the future to be worked out.
In concluding my critique let me express the hope that the overwhelming
conceptual and methodological inadequacies of current content analysis will not
continue to discourage. social scientists from using this technique.

Current

literature in content analysis (Barcus, 1959; North -et al., 1963; Stone -et al., 1966
Holsti, 1968) describes many small successes.

But I believe that the dominating

concern with methods and results will not solve the salient problems of the technique
which are essentially methodological.

A more solution-oriented approach to these

problems is taken in a contribution (Krippendorff, 1969) to a forthcoming volume
on The Analysis of Corrnnunication Content .

..
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